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Abstract 
Homomorphic encryption has largely been studied in context of public key cryptosystems. 
But there are applications which inherently would require symmetric keys. We propose a 
symmetric key encryption scheme with fully homomorphic evaluation capabilities. The 
operations are matrix based, that is the scheme consists of mapping the operations on integers 
to operations on matrix. We aim at proposing an idea how a fully homomorphic scheme with 
symmetric keys can be inculcated into application like private data processing. We propose 
ideas for primitives required in a FHE scheme to make it practical and more useful. Certain 
applications which can benefit from homomorphic encryption involve more than one party, 
such as multiparty computation. Majority of the proposed schemes have not explored this 
area. Our proposal aims at answering this. The proposed scheme is computationally light, 
efficient, multi-hop, circuit-private and can be deployed in multiple user environment. It 
derives its security from hardness of factorizing a large integer, which is basis of many public 
key cryptosystems. Besides the primitives for encryption, decryption and evaluation, we have 
included primitives which are useful to adapt the scheme to specific applications of 
delegating computation and data access control in multiuser environments like that of cloud 
computing. We also include a protocol which uses the proposed scheme for private data 
processing in clouds. It can easily be extended for keyword search in indices of encrypted 
databases, PIR and electronic voting. 
We also propose possible variants which give an idea of how can a fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme be designed using symmetric keys. We have also included a checklist of 
properties of a homomorphic scheme when employing it to certain application and tallied our 
proposal against it. We have presented security analysis of our scheme along with formal 
proofs. The performance of the scheme has been compared with current efficient schemes. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The amount of data generated, stored and communicated electronically is growing 
exponentially year by year, and the related growth is the vulnerability of data hence the 
demand of making it secure. Cryptography has emerged as most effective data protection 
solution. At present, cryptographic primitives have provided both the data owners and users 
efficient means to ensure security of their data and algorithms in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication, validation, and verification.  
1.1 Conventional Cryptography:  
All cryptographic techniques in use today can be broadly classified as Symmetric and 
Asymmetric encryption.  
• Symmetric or the secret key based cryptography implies using same key for both 
encryption and decryption. It is a cryptosystem defined by two algorithms. During 
communication, the sender uses the encryption algorithm Enc(m,k) where m is 
message to be encrypted and k is the secret key, to obtain a ciphertext c corresponding 
to plaintext m. This encrypted message is sent to the receiver. The receiver retrieves 
the message using decryption algorithm Dec(c,k). 
•  Asymmetric or public key based systems refer to use of different keys for encryption 
and decryption. The key known only to a sender (or receiver) is called the private key, 
and the key which is published and thus known to more than one party is called the 
public key. Encryption algorithm, Enc(m,pk) encrypts message m under public key 
pk, and the message is retrieved using decryption algorithm Dec(m,sk), where sk is 
the private key. In certain applications like digital signatures, encryption is performed 
using private key, hence decryption is done using the public key.  
1.2 New Challenges Posed by Cloud Computing 
The emergence of cloud computing where critical customer and enterprise data could be held 
by third party cloud providers in a public and/or shared (multi-tenant) computing and storage 
environments highlights the need to use encryption as a primary security control. Security 
threats and application of encryption mechanisms are discussed in context of “data at rest”, 
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“data in transit”, and “data in use”.  While the security of data in transit benefits from mature 
encryption tools such as SSL, protecting data at rest while ensuring its availability presents 
additional and ongoing challenges.  Encryption of a database should not adversely affect the 
ability of applications to use this data. Hence, in a cloud computing scenario, encryption 
solutions must be architectured to achieve the goals of both data protection (confidentiality 
and integrity) as well as availability of the data, the service, and the capability to collaborate 
and share data easily. Neither symmetric nor asymmetric encryption methods completely 
suffice the needs of cloud computing environment. Here homomorphic cryptography comes 
into picture. 
1.3 Homomorphic Cryptography 
The aim of homomorphic cryptography is to ensure privacy of data in communication, 
storage or in use by processes with mechanisms similar to conventional cryptography, but 
with added capabilities of computing over encrypted data, searching an encrypted data, etc. 
Homomorphism is a property by which a problem in one algebraic system can be converted 
to a problem in another algebraic system, be solved and the solution later can also be 
translated back effectively. Thus, homomorphism makes secure delegation of computation to 
a third party possible. Many conventional encryption schemes possess either multiplicative or 
additive homomorphic property and are currently in use for respective applications. Yet, a 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme which could perform any arbitrary computation over 
encrypted data appeared in 2009 as Gentry’s work [1]. 
1.4 Open problems 
Though Gentry’s blueprint[1] provides a solution, what remains is developing the basic 
scheme to have more feasible ones. The major drawback of the schemes based on Gentry’s 
blueprint has been large public key size, many keys, growth of ciphertext per computation in 
a circuit and accumulation of noise. While a major application of FHE is delegation of 
computation due to lack of resources at the user-end, majority of schemes are 
computationally intensive making it practically of no use for such users. Another open 
problem is of reducing key sizes to a manageable level since the procedure requires at least 
three keys (encryption, re-encryption or evaluation, decryption). The approach should be now 
to focus on devising application-specific homomorphisms, like a light weight scheme, a fast 
scheme, a semantically secure scheme, a multiparty scheme and so on. The schemes which 
are currently in use for applications like e-voting, PIR etc are not fully homomorphic. They 
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are either SHE (Somewhat Homomorphic encryption) or are homomorphic over a limited 
number of circuits/operations, hence limited to a few number of applications, cannot be 
extended or generalized for complete category of applications. Mostly all schemes proposed 
so far are based on public-key cryptography. It has obvious advantage of being based on 
hardness problems like Large Integer Factorization, Diffie-Hellman problems or 
Approximate GCD problem. But there are applications which inherently would require 
symmetric keys, or perhaps no use of a public key at all (viz a user storing his private data on 
cloud only for personal purposes would need only a secret key). Further there are applications 
oriented towards involvement of more than one party, such as multiparty computation. 
Majority of the proposed schemes have not explored this area. 
Given the large amount of data and huge costs of encrypting and decrypting them (also the 
large number of keys to be distributed due to multiple stakeholders) gave way to hybrid 
clouds and data classification. Hybrid clouds allow combining private enterprise clouds with 
on-premise data (perceived security is high) to collaborate with public clouds involving third 
party storage providers (not so secure). Data classification involves different levels of 
security depending on criticality of data. Moreover, many data centric applications involve 
multiple users and can benefit only if the encryption process can involve the hierarchy of data 
classification. A possible solution to be explored is incremental encryption with 
homomorphic properties. 
 
1.5 Problem Statement 
Design an efficient and practically feasible fully homomorphic scheme that uses symmetric 
keys and subsequently design a protocol for its use in multiuser data-centric applications.  
 
1.6 Our Contribution 
Vaikuntanathan presented a state-of-art survey [2] of FHE and how it can be applied for 
delegation of computation. He raised an open question “Can Homomorphic encryption be 
efficient enough to be practical?”. Our proposal addresses this open problem. The proposed 
scheme is based on matrix operations which are computationally “light” and fully 
homomorphic. It uses symmetric keys of small size thereby making it suitable for many data 
centric applications. It derives its security from hardness of factorizing a large integer, which 
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is basis of many public key cryptosystems. We extend the approach used in [3]. Besides the 
primitives for encryption, decryption and evaluation, we have included primitives which are 
useful to adapt the scheme to specific applications of delegating computation and data access 
control in multiuser environments like that of cloud computing. It can easily be extended for 
keyword search in indices of encrypted databases, PIR and electronic voting. We have also 
included a checklist of properties of a homomorphic scheme when employing it to certain 
application and compared our proposal against it. The proposed scheme is multi-hop, ensures 
circuit-privacy, can handle arbitrary size of computations without the need of noise 
management and has scope of parallelization. We also present a formal security analysis of 
the scheme. 
1.7 Organization of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of existing homomorphic schemes, the analyses and applications 
available in literature. It gives a brief and clear overview of the underlying principles of such 
schemes and their limitations. 
Chapter 3, as its title – “Homomorphic Encryption” suggests, acquaints with the relevant 
terminology. It contains formal definitions, properties and representative applications of 
Homomorphic Encryption. 
Chapter 4, titled “Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme with Symmetric Keys” describes 
our proposal. it has a detailed description of the primitives, the algorithms along with 
examples, performance and security analyses. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and presents the possible aspects in which the further 
work can be done. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
Beginning from the notion of privacy homomorphisms in 1978, Homomorphic Encryption 
had been more like a holy grail lurking in minds of cryptographers and quest did not end until 
2009. Since then the field has been growing rapidly with so much potential anticipated that 
cryptographers worldwide are now thinking to consider it an entire new field of computer 
science. 
2.1 Privacy Homomorphisms 
The idea of using homomorphism along with encryption was introduced by Rivest, Adleman, 
and Dertouzous in 1978 [4]. They asked for an encryption function that permits encrypted 
data to be operated on, without preliminary decryption of the operands, and they called those 
schemes privacy homomorphisms. Unfortunately, shortly after its publication, major security 
flaws were found in the original proposed schemes of Rivest et al. The search for fully 
homomorphic cryptosystems began. 
2.2 RSA- A Multiplicative Homomorphic Scheme 
In 1978, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman published their public-key cryptosystem [5], which 
only uses elementary ideas from number theory. It is one of the first homomorphic 
cryptosystems. It is the most widely used public-key cryptosystem. It may be used to provide 
both secrecy and digital signatures and its security is based on the intractability of the integer 
factorization problem. The RSA scheme has a multiplicative homomorphic property. This 
means it is possible to perform multiplications with the encryptions of messages without 
losing or tampering with their underlying information. This is possible since the operation 
"multiplication" in the ciphertext space (Zn, ·) can be compared with the operation 
"multiplication" in the plaintext space (Zn,·  ). The same is illustrated in Fig 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Multiplicative Homomorphic Property of RSA cryptosystem 
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2.3 Paillier – An Additive Homomorphic Scheme 
Pascal Paillier introduced his cryptosystem[6] in 1999. The proposed technique is based on 
composite residuosity classes, whose computation is believed to be computationally difficult. 
It is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography and inherits additive 
homomorphic properties, specifically the product of two ciphertexts will decrypt to the sum 
of their plaintexts. It is illustrated in figure. 
 
Figure 2.2 Additive Homomorphic Property of Pailier Cryptosystem 
 
2.4 Gentry – An Algebraically Homomorphic Scheme 
In a breakthrough work Gentry described in 2009 the first encryption scheme that supports 
both addition and multiplication on ciphertexts, i.e. a fully homomorphic encryption scheme 
[1]. Gentry used a method which no other researcher tried before. Instead of directly creating 
a superior scheme, he build one from a somewhat homomorphic scheme, if its decryption 
circuit is sufficiently simple. The construction proceeds in successive steps: first Gentry 
describes a “somewhat homomorphic” scheme that supports a limited number of additions 
and multiplications on ciphertexts. This is because every ciphertext has a noise component 
and any homomorphic operation applied to ciphertexts increases the noise in the resulting 
ciphertext. Once this noise reaches a certain threshold the resulting ciphertext does not 
decrypt correctly anymore; this limits the degree of the polynomial that can be applied to 
ciphertexts. Secondly Gentry shows how to “squash” the decryption procedure so that it can 
be expressed as a low degree polynomial in the bits of the ciphertext and the secret key 
(equivalently a circuit of small depth). Then the breakthrough idea consists in evaluating this 
decryption polynomial not on the bits of the ciphertext and the secret key (as in regular 
decryption), but homomorphically on the encryption of those bits. Then instead of recovering 
the bit plaintext, one gets an encryption of this bit plaintext, i.e. yet another ciphertext for the 
same plaintext. Now if the degree of the decryption polynomial is small enough, the resulting 
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noise in this new ciphertext can be smaller than in the original ciphertext; this is called the 
“ciphertext refresh” procedure. Given two refreshed ciphertexts one can apply again the 
homomorphic operation (either addition or multiplication), which was not necessarily 
possible on the original ciphertexts because of the noise threshold. Using this “ciphertext 
refresh” procedure the number of permissible homomorphic operations becomes unlimited 
and we get a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The prerequisite for the “ciphertext 
refresh” procedure is that the degree of the polynomial that can be evaluated on ciphertexts 
exceeds the degree of the decryption polynomial (times two, since one must allow for a 
subsequent addition or multiplication of refreshed ciphertexts); this is called the 
“bootstrappability” condition. Once the scheme becomes bootstrappable it can be converted 
into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme by providing the encryption of the secret key 
bits inside the public key. 
 
2.5 Improvements to Gentry’s Blueprint – Lattice based 
 
2.5.1 Implementation of Gentry’s blueprint, 2010 
At PKC 2010 Smart and Vercauteren [7] made the first attempt to implement Gentry's 
scheme using a variant based on principal ideal lattices and requiring that the determinant of 
the lattice be a prime number. However the authors of [7] could not obtain a bootstrappable 
scheme because that would have required a lattice dimension of at least n = 227, whereas due 
to the prime determinant requirement they could not generate keys for dimensions n > 2048, 
which is essential for security purposes. This implied that Gentry’s blueprint was not yet 
practical. 
 
2.5.2 Gentry-Halevi Scheme 2010 
The authors in [8] follow the same direction as Smart and Vercauteren[7] , but for key 
generation they eliminate the requirement that the determinant is a prime. Additionally they 
present many clever optimizations. Four concrete parameter settings are provided, from a 
“toy” setting in dimension 512, to “small”, “medium” and “large” settings of dimensions 
2048, 8192 and 32768, respectively. For the “large" setting public key size is 2.3 Gigabytes. 
The authors of [8] report that for an optimized implementation on a high-end workstation, 
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key generation takes 2.2 hours, encryption takes 3 minutes, and ciphertext refresh takes 30 
minutes. 
 
2.5.3 Optimized Gentry, 2010 
Concurrently, Stehle and Steinfeld described two improvements [9] to Gentry's fully 
homomorphic scheme based on ideal lattices and its analysis. They introduced a probabilistic 
decryption algorithm that can be implemented with an algebraic circuit of low multiplicative 
degree. Combined together, these improvements lead to a faster fully homomorphic scheme, 
with a Õ( 3.5λ )  bit complexity per elementary binary add/mult gate. 
 
2.5.4 SIMD Gentry, 2011 
Gentry’s scheme [1] performs encryption and decryption on plaintext of 1-bit length. Hence, 
it is intuitive to think that certain operations could be performed on several bits in parallel to 
reduce runtime. In [7], Smart and Vercauteren mentioned that SIMD(single instruction, 
multiple data) style operations on data can be supported by their scheme. In [10], Smart and 
Vercauteren show how to select parameters for Gentry and Halevi’s implementation [8] that 
use SIMD operations for the somewhat homomorphic scheme, how to construct a fully 
homomorphic scheme when performing re-encryptions in parallel and in which way SIMD 
operations can be useful in practice. The main point is that the parallel version is 2.4 times 
faster than the standard FHE scheme and the ciphertext size is reduced by a factor 1/72. Thus, 
exploiting parallelism in the constituent algorithms can increase efficiency of a scheme. 
 
2.5.5 Gentry-Halevi without squashing, 2011 
Gentry and Halevi in [11] show how to get rid of squashing as well, using a completely 
different technique, while the construction still relies on ideal lattices. The new approach 
constructs FHE as a hybrid of a SWHE and a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption 
(MHE) scheme. The new approach shows how to bootstrap without having to “squash” the 
decryption circuit. The main technique is to express the decryption function of SWHE 
schemes as a depth-3 (ΣΠΣ) arithmetic circuit of a particular form. When evaluating this 
circuit homomorphically (as needed for bootstrapping), it uses a MHE scheme, such as 
Elgamal, to handle the Π part. Due to the special form of the circuit, the switch to the MHE 
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scheme can be done without having to evaluate anything homomorphically. The result is 
translated back to the SWHE scheme by homomorphically evaluating the decryption function 
of the MHE scheme. Thus, the SWHE scheme only needs to be capable of evaluating the 
MHE scheme's decryption function, not its own decryption function, thereby avoiding the 
circularity that necessitated squashing in the original blueprint. 
 
2.5.6 Gentry-Halevi-Smart, 2011 
The main bottleneck in the bootstrapping procedure of Gentry’s blueprint is the need to 
evaluate homomorphically the reduction of one integer modulo another. This is typically 
done by emulating a binary modular reduction circuit, using bit operations on binary 
representation of integers. Gentry, Halevi and Smart present a simpler approach[12] that 
bypasses the homomorphic modular-reduction bottleneck to some extent, by working with a 
modulus very close to a power of two. The method is easier to describe and implement than 
the generic binary circuit approach, and is likely to be faster in practice. In some cases it also 
allows storing the encryption of the secret key as a single ciphertext, thus reducing the size of 
the public key. This method can also be combined with the SIMD homomorphic computation 
techniques. 
 
2.6  Fully Homomorphic Encryption based on Approximate GCD 
 
2.6.1 DGHV, 2010 
Based on Gentry's approach a different fully homomorphic scheme by van Dijk, Gentry, 
Halevi and Vaikuntanathan (DGHV) over the integers appeared at Eurocrypt 2010 [13]. As in 
Gentry's scheme the authors first describe a somewhat homomorphic scheme supporting a 
limited number of additions and multiplications over encrypted bits. Then they apply Gentry's 
“squash decryption” technique to get a bootstrappable scheme and then Gentry's “ciphertext 
refresh” procedure to get a fully homomorphic scheme. The main appeal of the scheme 
(compared to the original Gentry's scheme) is its conceptual simplicity: all operations are 
done over the integers instead of ideal lattices. However the public-key was in Õ( 10λ  ) which 
is too large for any practical system. The major achievement of [13] over [1] was that now 
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the plaintext consisted of integers rather than single bits leading to a better blueprint to 
improve upon. 
 
2.6.2 Improved DGHV, 2011 
Coron et al [14] showed how to reduce the public key size of the somewhat homomorphic 
scheme from Õ( 10λ ) down to Õ( 7λ ). The idea consists in storing only a smaller subset of the 
public key and then generating the full public key on the y by combining the elements in the 
small subset multiplicatively. The new scheme is still semantically secure, but under a 
stronger variant of the approximate GCD assumption. The second contribution of [14] is to 
describe an implementation of the fully homomorphic DGHV scheme under new variant, 
using some of the optimizations from [8]. They use the refined analysis from [9] of the sparse 
subset sum problem; but not the probabilistic decryption circuit from [9] because as in [8] the 
error probability is too high for chosen set of parameters. The main difficulty is to determine 
a secure set of concrete parameters. The approach in [14] is to implement the known attacks, 
measure their running time and extrapolate for large parameters, so that concrete parameters 
according to the desired level of security can be fixed. [14] have obtained similar 
performances as the Gentry-Halevi implementation [8]. More precisely the four security 
levels inspired by the levels from [8] (though they may not be directly comparable due to 
different notions of “security bits”): “toy”, “small”, “medium” and “large”, corresponding to 
42, 52, 62 and 72 bits of security respectively. For “large" parameters, encryption and 
recryption take 3 minutes and 14 minutes respectively, with a public key size of 800 MBytes. 
Decryption is always close to instantaneous. This shows that fully homomorphic encryption 
can be implemented with a simple scheme. 
 
2.6.3 Attack on DGHV, 2012 
Chunsheng proposed a heuristic attack [15] on the fully homomorphic encryption over the 
integers by using lattice reduction algorithm. Their result shows that one can directly obtain 
the plaintext from a ciphertext and the public key without using the secret key for some 
parameter settings of the FHE in [13]. They constructed a new lattice based on the public key 
and recover the plaintext bit from ciphertext by applying LLL reduction algorithm. They 
further showed that such an attack can be avoided by setting parameter γ=λ6. But, the scheme 
is less practical in this case. In addition, they suggested an improvement scheme to avoid the 
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above lattice attack.  The secret key which is a large integer in [13] is now replaced by a 
matrix. To implement FHE, one only needs to add ciphertexts of the secret key to the public 
key. The size of the public key is O(λ3log λ) and the size of the secret key is O(λ2).  
 
2.6.4 Batch FHE, 2012 
Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi [16] extended the DGHV scheme to batch fully homomorphic 
encryption, i.e. to a scheme that supports encrypting and homomorphically processing a 
vector of plaintext bits as a single ciphertext. It maintains semantic security and allows one to 
perform arbitrary permutations on the underlying plaintext vector given the ciphertext and the 
public key. Though there is no notable achievement in terms of efficiency, it presents a new 
approach for obtaining features of LWE-based FHE scheme in a scheme based on 
Approximate-GCD. 
 
2.6.5 CRT-based FHE, 2012 
Kim, Lee, Yun and Cheon [17] combined the ideas of [4] and [13]. As compared to [13] this 
scheme has larger plaintext, reduced computation overhead and support for SIMD style 
operations. Though the achievement is not on efficiency, [17] suggests new methods to 
construct a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. 
 
2.7 Fully Homomorphic Encryption based on Ring-Learning with Errors 
 
2.7.1 FHE-LWE, 2011 
Schemes based on Gentry’s blueprint suffer from large size of keys and high per-gate 
evaluation time which is a bottleneck in practical deployment of FHE. This led to a new 
series of research works. In particular, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [18] show that (leveled) 
FHE can be based on the hardness of the much more standard “learning with errors” (LWE) 
problem, using a new re-linearization technique. In contrast, all previous schemes relied on 
complexity assumptions related to ideals in various rings. Instead of using squashing, this 
proposal introduced a new dimension-modulus reduction technique, which shortens the 
ciphertexts and reduces the decryption complexity, without introducing additional 
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assumptions. This scheme has very short ciphertexts and can be used it to construct an 
asymptotically efficient LWE-based single-server private information retrieval (PIR) 
protocol, also proposed in [18]. 
 
2.7.2 BGV, 2011 
Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [19] build on (a refinement of) the main technique in 
[18] to construct an FHE scheme with asymptotically linear efficiency, that is the per gate 
computation is almost linear in security parameter. While [18] uses modulus switching in 
“one shot” to obtain a small ciphertext, this scheme uses modulus switching iteratively, to 
keep the noise level essentially constant, while sacrificing modulus size and gradually 
sacrificing the remaining homomorphic capacity of the scheme. 
 
2.7.3 Optimized BGV, 2011 
Lauter, Naehrig and Vaikuntanathan published results [20] of implementation of the scheme 
BV [18]. They also proposed a number of application-specific optimizations to the scheme. 
Most notably they show how to convert between different message encodings in a ciphertext. 
They propose two methods. The first is to encode integers in a ciphertext so as to enable 
efficient computation of their sums and products over the integers. This is useful in 
computing the mean, the standard deviation and other private statistics efficiently. The 
second trick shows how to “pack’ n encryptions of bits into a single encryption of the n-bit 
string. Some homomorphic operations, for example comparison of integers or private 
information retrieval, require bit-wise encryptions of the input. Once the answers are 
computed, though, they can be packed into a single encryption using this trick. 
 
2.7.4 HELib, 2013 
Recently, IBM has released software package HELib in April 2013. HElib is a software 
library that implements homomorphic encryption (HE). Currently available is an 
implementation of the BGV [19] scheme, along with many optimizations to make 
homomorphic evaluation run faster, focusing mostly on effective use of the Smart-
Vercauteren [7] ciphertext packing techniques and the Gentry-Halevi-Smart [12] 
optimizations. 
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2.8 Fully Homomorphic Encryption based on Large Integer Factorization 
2.8.1 Xiao et al, 2012 
In 2012 Xiao et al developed a novel symmetric-key homomorphic encryption scheme [3]. It 
is proven that the security of this encryption scheme is equivalent to the large integer 
factorization problem, and it can withstand an attack with up to ln  poly( )m λ  chosen 
plaintexts for any predetermined m, constant that is polynomial in the security parameter λ . 
Multiplication, encryption, and decryption are almost linear in mλ , and addition is linear in 
mλ . The scheme downgrades the security requirement to achieve efficiency. Although the 
algorithm is not semantically secure, it can face an adversary with up to ln  poly( )m λ chosen 
plaintext and ciphertext pairs, and the security is equivalent to the large integer factorization 
problem. Thus, homomorphic encryption scheme [3] can be used in applications where 
semantic security is not required and one-wayness security is sufficient. 
A further consideration in [3] is practical multiple-user data-centric applications. To allow 
multiple users to retrieve data from a server all users need to have the same key. In [3] the 
master encryption key is transformed into different user keys to develop a protocol to support 
correct and secure communication between the users and the server using different user keys. 
The data in the data center are encrypted using homomorphic encryption with a “master key” 
k. Different keys are assigned to different users which are actually transformations of master 
key k. Such multi-user system can withstand an adversary with upto ln  poly( )m λ plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. 
2.8.2 MORE&PORE, 2012 
Kipnis and Hibshoosh [21] present high performance non-deterministic fully-homomorphic 
methods for practical randomization of data (over commutative ring), and symmetric-key 
encryption of random mod-N data over ring ZN well suited for crypto applications. These 
methods secure, for example, the multivariate input or the coefficients of a polynomial 
function running in an open untrusted environment. The scheme has matrix based operation 
very similar to [3] and polynomial based operations which is a novel idea. The efficient 
nature of the methods - one large-number multiplication per encryption and six for the 
product of two encrypted values - motivates and enables the use of low cost collaborative 
security platforms for crypto applications such as keyed-hash or private key derivation 
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algorithms. It is shown how to secure OSS public-key signature against Pollard attack. 
Further, [21] demonstrates how the homomorphic randomization of data can offer protection 
for an AES-key against side-channel attacks. Finally, the methods provide both fault 
detection and verification of computed-data integrity. 
 
2.9 Homomorphic Encryption in Cloud Computing 
Fully Homomorphic Encryption combines security with usability. It can help preserve 
customer privacy while outsourcing various kinds of computation to the cloud, besides 
storage. Some concrete and valuable applications of FHE have been mentioned in [20]. They 
have considered situations where data streams from multiple sources, is uploaded in 
encrypted form to the cloud, and processed by the cloud to provide valuable services to the 
content owner. There are two aspects of the computation considered: the data itself 
(confidentiality), and the function to be computed on this data (circuit privacy). Depending 
on whether one or both of these are confidential and hence not to be disclosed to the cloud, 
[20] proposes three broad kinds of applications: 
1. Medical applications: private data, public functions 
2. Financial Applications: private data, private functions 
3. Advertising and Pricing: Only results are public 
Application of FHE to database querying is studied systematically in [22]. It identifies what 
fully homomorphic encryption can do and what it cannot do well for supporting general 
database queries at a conceptual level. The study shows that using a fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme that supports addition, multiplication, AND and XOR on ciphertexts, it is 
possible to process a complex selection, range, join or aggregation query on encrypted data 
on the server side, and to return the encrypted matching answers in a result buffer. For 
queries without fixed answer sizes, it is however not guaranteed all matching answers will be 
correctly constructed from the result buffer, instead the answers can be constructed from the 
result buffer with overwhelming probability. 
 
2.10 Survey Extraction 
Encryption schemes with homomorphic properties would suffice the need of security 
meanwhile preserving system usability in clouds. While a major application of FHE is 
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delegation of computation due to lack of resources at the user-end, majority of schemes are 
computationally intensive making it practically of no use for such users. The major problem 
is of reducing key sizes to a manageable level since the procedure requires at least three keys 
(encryption, re-encryption or evaluation, decryption). A related issue is the noise 
management – as the noise associated with the homomorphic evaluation increases with every 
operation on the ciphertext. Moreover, this noise puts a bound on the size of circuits that can 
be correctly evaluated homomorphically. Mostly the issue has been resolved by some 
“refreshing” techniques which in turn increase the overall time complexity of a computation. 
Much of the research has been devoted towards developing FHE schemes using public-key 
cryptographic primitives; area of symmetric FHE should also be explored as there are many 
applications which inherently are suitable for symmetric encryption. Then, there are certain 
applications which involve multiple users, hence requiring multiparty protocols involving 
FHE. Majority of the existing FHE schemes have not explored this area. 
Furthermore, there is a need of a well-agreed upon list of properties that any homomorphic 
encryption scheme would possess in order to be deployable practically. The properties like 
circuit privacy, targeted malleability have been discussed a lot in literature, yet all of them 
have not been consolidated. Also, security notions for conventional encryption have been as 
is applied to homomorphic encryption, rendering any homomorphic scheme non-INDCPA2 
secure, which could mislead users to think that a homomorphic encryption is not much secure 
for them, while FHE aims at ensuring security where no other means is able to (like to the 
data being used in public cloud). 
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Chapter 3 
HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
The aim of homomorphic cryptography is to ensure privacy of data in communication and 
storage processes, such as the ability to delegate computations to untrusted parties. If a user 
could take a problem defined in one algebraic system and encode it into a problem in a 
different algebraic system in a way that decoding back to the original algebraic system is 
hard, then the user could encode expensive computations and send them to the untrusted 
party. This untrusted party then performs the corresponding computation in the second 
algebraic system, returning the result to the user. Upon receiving the result, the user can 
decode it into a solution in the original algebraic system, while the untrusted party learns 
nothing of which computation was actually performed. Fig 3.1 illustrates this.  
Suppose we have a homomorphic cryptosystem which can translate operations on integers to 
operations on polynomials of single variable. As shown in Fig 3.1, two integers are encrypted 
into polynomials p1(x) and p2(x). Now when these polynomials are added to give a third 
polynomial, it is required that the resultant polynomial when translated back should be equal 
to sum of plaintext integers. 
 
Figure 3.1 Concept of Homomorphic encryption 
This chapter discusses various basic definitions and other terminology related to 
homomorphic cryptosystems. Thereafter we present a consolidated list of properties of 
Homomorphic cryptosystems, and some representative applications. 
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption: Terminology 
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At a high-level, the essence of fully homomorphic encryption is simple: given ciphertexts that 
encrypt the plaintexts x1 ,x2 … xn, fully homomorphic encryption should allow anyone (not 
just the key-holder) to output a ciphertext that encrypts f(x1, x2 … xn) for any desired function 
f, as long as that function can be efficiently computed. No information about x1, x2 … xn or 
f(x1, x2 … xn) or any intermediate plaintext values, should leak; the inputs, output and 
intermediate values are always encrypted. There are different ways of defining what it means 
for the final ciphertext to “encrypt” f(x1, x2 … xn). The minimal requirement is correctness. 
Various aspects of such computation along with encryption lead to different forms of 
Homomorphic encryption. 
Below we present formal definitions related to cryptosystems which possess homomorphic 
computation capability. 
Homomorphic Encryption 
Formally, homomorphic encryption scheme has been defined till now in context of public key 
systems only. We extend the existing definition so as to incorporate both symmetric as well 
as public key systems. A homomorphic encryption scheme is a quadruple of probabilistic-
polynomial time algorithms 
ε =(Keygen, Enc, Dec, Eval) 
Keygen – In public-key based systems the key generation algorithm takes input the security 
parameter λ  and outputs keys (pk, sk, ek), where pk is public key sk is private key, and ek is 
evaluation key. In symmetric key systems algorithm takes input the security parameters λ  
and m and outputs keys (k, ek) where k is secret key and ek is evaluation key. 
Enc – The encryption algorithm converts plaintext to ciphertext as 1( , )c Enc keypi← . pi is a 
plaintext bit or integer, and key1 is pk for public crytptosystem and k for symmetric scheme. 
Dec – The decryption algorithm converts ciphertext to plaintext as 2( , )Dec c keypi ← . key2 is sk 
for public crytptosystem and k for symmetric scheme. 
Eval – The homomorphic evaluation algorithm evaluates the result of a computation f on 
ciphertexts c1,c2,…, cl using evaluation key ek.  1 2( , , ,..., , )f lc Eval f c c c ek← . Use of this key is 
optional, as in some schemes, like that of our proposal, there is no need of an evaluation key. 
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Here if f is represented as an arithmetic circuit or a Boolean circuit equivalently, the scheme 
is said to be circuit-based. When f is defined as mathematical function, the scheme is non-
circuit based. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Homomorphic Encryption with Asymmetric keys 
C-homomorphism 
Let C be a class of functions. A scheme ε  is C-homomorphic if for every function in C, the 
Eval algorithm of ε outputs such that 
1 2( , , ,..., , )f lc Eval f c c c ek← and 1 2 2( , ,..., ) ( , )l ff Dec c keypi pi pi =  
Compactness 
Compactness requires that the size of the ciphertext after homomorphic evaluation does not 
depend on either the number of inputs or the complexity of the function f, but only on the size 
of the output of f. 
Somewhat homomorphic 
Somewhat homomorphic scheme supports a limited number of additions and multiplications 
on ciphertexts. This is because every ciphertext has a noise component and any homomorphic 
operation applied to ciphertexts increases the noise in the resulting ciphertext. Once this noise 
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reaches a certain threshold the resulting ciphertext does not decrypt correctly anymore; this 
limits the degree of the polynomial that can be applied to ciphertexts. 
Fully homomorphic encryption 
A schemeε is fully homomorphic if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all 
arithmetic circuits over GF(2). 
Leveled fully homomorphic 
This is a relaxation in fully homomorphic scheme. A leveled fully homomorphic encryption 
scheme is a homomorphic scheme where Keygen algorithm gets an additional input l and the 
resulting scheme is homomorphic for all depth-l binary arithmetic circuits. 
Multi-hop Homomorphic 
In some applications, it is useful to require that the output of algorithm Eval can be used as an 
input for another homomorphic evaluation. A homomorphic encryption scheme with this 
property is called a “multi-hop homomorphic” encryption scheme. 
 
3.2 Properties of Homomorphic Encryption 
Field of homomorphic cryptography is yet in developing stage and various schemes differ in 
what they have to offer. Selecting a scheme for an application requires a consumer to check 
its suitability to the application. Various applications require homomorphic operations in 
different perspective. This variety poses some challenges in designing of fully homomorphic 
schemes. Also, certain issues should be addressed well before one embarks upon devising a 
new scheme. This section presents some of the major concerns related to as to what is 
expected of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme so that it is practical and feasible 
enough to be employed in certain application. We have identified some common properties 
which already exist or are desirable in a homomorphic encryption scheme. They are: 
1. Circuit/Function privacy  - Circuit privacy is a property of homomorphic encryption 
that guarantees that the server’s input namely, the computation function f – remains 
private from the client. In particular, circuit privacy requires that the output of 
1 2( , , , ..., , )lEval f c c c ek  does not reveal any information about f to the client, beyond the 
output 1 2( , ,..., )lf pi pi pi . This has a security implication when computations have been 
delegated to an untrusted party. Hence, applications involving multiparty 
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computation, secure delegation of computation, applications involving public data 
with private functions and the likes. 
2. Targeted Malleability –In context of conventional cryptography, malleability is an 
undesirable property. An encryption algorithm is malleable if it is possible for an 
adversary to transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext which decrypts to a related 
plaintext. That is, given an encryption of a plaintext m, it is possible to generate 
another ciphertext which decrypts to f(m), for a known function f, without necessarily 
knowing or learning m. It actually allows an attacker to modify the contents of a 
message. But, isn’t this the aim of FHE to be able to compute a function of m without 
knowing m? Hence, here we regress to a related property called targeted malleability. 
This notion of “targeted malleability” was put forward by Boneh et al [23]: “given an 
encryption scheme that supports homomorphic operations with respect to some set of 
functions F, we would like to ensure that the malleability of the scheme is targeted 
only at the set F. That is, it should not be possible to apply any homomorphic 
operation other than the ones in F.” [23] also suggests how this can be achieved by 
requiring the entity performing the homomorphic operation to embed a proof in the 
ciphertext showing that the ciphertext was computed using an allowable function. The 
decryptor can then verify the proof before decrypting the ciphertext. The problem that 
might arise due to repeatedly performing a homomorphic operation is that number of 
proofs grows making the ciphertext grow at least linearly with the number of repeated 
homomorphic operations. Thus, limiting this expansion is also highly desirable. 
3. Verifiability of Computation - Homomorphic encryption is being considered as an 
answer to the problem of securely outsourcing computations, yet it is useful only 
when the returned result can be trusted. Here verifiability of the result comes into 
picture. One such scenario is of delegating computation to a cloud. One of the main 
security issues that arises in this setting is how can the clients trust that the cloud 
performed the computation correctly? After all, the cloud has the financial benefits to 
run a fast computation which could be incorrect, freeing up valuable compute time for 
other transactions. Is there a way to verifiably outsource computations, where the 
client can, without much computational effort, check the correctness of the results 
provided by the cloud? Furthermore, can this be done without requiring much 
interaction between the client and the cloud? 
4. Multiple Users - Almost every proposed fully homomorphic scheme considers single 
user setting, with the exception of [3] which discusses how multiple users can 
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participate in a homomorphic operation. Most of the applications of homomorphic 
operations involve multiple data coming from different users (like multiparty 
computations). Hence, the focus should be on devising homomorphic operations 
which can be used in multiuser systems. 
5. Parallel Computations – If the evaluation function of a homomorphic scheme is able 
to use the inherent parallelism of certain computations like matrix multiplication, we 
can benefit in terms of efficiency. If a number of bits can be packed into single 
argument (like an integer) and the homomorphic evaluation function performs as if 
the function was performed per bit, we can benefit in terms of communication cost, 
length of ciphertext and efficiency. This promises to be a field of interesting research. 
The approach of Single Instruction Multiple Data can be applied when many 
messages are to be encrypted using same key, or decrypted. 
6. Unlinkability - A term related to circuit privacy is unlinkability, which asks that the 
output of the homomorphic evaluation algorithm is computationally indistinguishable 
from the output of the encryption algorithm. 
7. Multi-hop – If a sequence of operations can be performed on a ciphertext in 
succession without the need of any intermediate step which is not a part of overall 
computation being performed, then the FHE scheme is said to be multi-hop. It is 
possible if output of the Eval algorithm is of the same form as its input. 
 
3.3 Applications of Homomorphic Encryption 
Potential of homomorphic encryption had been identified very early. Since then there have 
been many applications which necessitated a scheme that could compute homomorphically 
on encrypted data. But with the growing interest and inclination towards cloud computing has 
opened numerous possible application areas for HE. According to authors in [20] these 
applications can be majorly classified based on whether we expect confidentiality of data or 
circuit privacy or both. The categories are: 
• Private Data, Public functions: like in Medical Applications 
• Private data, Private functions: like in Financial Applications 
• Applications like Advertising and pricing where only results should be public 
All the above categories of applications assume single data (content) owner who encrypts the 
data and stores it on an untrusted cloud. But with different cloud models and usage scenarios 
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upcoming we should look at a few representative categories of applications of Homomorphic 
Encryption. 
3.3.1 Electronic Voting 
Electronic voting is a special case of delegation of computation where one would like the 
election authorities to be able to count the votes and present the final results, but dislikes the 
idea that individual votes are first decrypted and afterwards tallied. In a voting system based 
on homomorphic encryption voters take turns incrementing an encrypted vote tally using a 
homomorphic operation. They are only allowed to increase the encrypted tally by 1 
(indicating a vote for the candidate) or by 0 (indicating a no vote for the candidate). In 
elections where each voter votes for one of ℓ candidates, voters modify the encrypted tallies 
by adding an ℓ-bit vector, where exactly one entry is 1 and the rest are all 0’s. They are 
unable to modify the counters in any other way. Thus, homomorphic encryption is a solution 
to creating a “secret ballot” system online, where neither votes are disclosed to anybody else 
except the voter, but also issues like vote-buying and coercing can be dealt with. 
3.3.2 Spam filters  
A spam filter implemented in a mail server adds a spam tag to encrypted emails whose 
content satisfies a certain spam predicate. The filter should be allowed to run the spam 
predicate, but should not modify the email contents. In this case, the set of allowable 
functions F would be the set of allowable spam predicates and nothing else. As email passes 
from one server to the next each server homomorphically computes its spam predicate on the 
encrypted output of the previous server. Each spam filter in the chain can run its chosen spam 
predicate and nothing else. 
3.3.3 Data management and Query processing in Clouds 
If all data (personal, health, financial etc) stored in the cloud were encrypted, that would 
effectively solve issues related to data security. However, a user would be unable to leverage 
the power of the cloud to carry out computation on data without first decrypting it, or 
shipping it entirely back to the user for computation. The cloud provider thus has to decrypt 
the data first (nullifying the issue of privacy and confidentiality), perform the computation 
then send the result to the user. What if the user could carry out any arbitrary computation on 
the hosted data without the cloud provider learning about the user’s data - computation is 
done on encrypted data without prior decryption. This is the promise of Fully homomorphic 
encryption schemes. However, there has not been a systematic study that analyzes the use of 
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fully homomorphic encryption for solving database queries beyond simple aggregations and 
numeric calculations, such as selection, range and join queries. Wang et al [22] discuss this 
and show how to use homomorphic encryption for supporting general database queries at a 
conceptual level, a scheme that supports addition, multiplication, AND and XOR on 
ciphertexts can also be used to process a complex selection, range, join or aggregation query 
on encrypted data on the server side, and to return the encrypted matching answers in a result 
buffer. It is further observed in [22] that for queries without fixed answer sizes, it is however 
not guaranteed all matching answers will be correctly constructed from the result buffer; 
instead the answers can be constructed from the result buffer with overwhelming probability. 
3.3.4 Multiparty Computation  
In the setting of multiparty computations one wants different parties to jointly compute some 
function without revealing their inputs to each other. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) 
can be defined as the problem of n players to compute an agreed function of their inputs in a 
secure way, where security means guaranteeing the correctness of the output as well as the 
privacy of the players’ inputs, even when some players cheat. Presently, to conduct such 
computations, one entity must usually know the inputs from all the participants; however 
these computations could occur between mutually untrusted parties, or even between 
competitors, so if nobody can be trusted enough to know all the inputs, privacy will become a 
primary concern. This privacy can be achieved through homomorphic encryption, and the 
computation itself can be expressed as a homomorphic circuit or function. 
3.3.5 Commitment Schemes 
Commitment schemes can be thought of like auctions where the auctioneer wants to assure 
that the offers are not publicly known in the bidding phase while at the same time ensuring 
that no one is able to repudiate their own offer. Fully homomorphic operations can be used to 
find the bidder with maximum offer at any time instant without revealing what the offer is. 
Also, we need some control mechanism so that bidder himself cannot repudiate or change the 
offer. 
3.3.6 Private Information Retrieval 
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol allows a database user, or client, to obtain 
information from a data- base in a manner that prevents the database from knowing which 
data was retrieved. Particularly, PIR allows a user to retrieve the ith bit of an n-bit database, 
without revealing the value of index i to the database. A natural and more practical extension 
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of PIR is PBR(Private Block Retrieval) in which, instead of retrieving only a single bit, the 
user retrieves a ith block with d bits in it. Though the problem is currently solved by querying 
dynamically, a homomorphic scheme is a better solution. In particular we consider private 
information retrieval from either a public database or a database with a group of subscribers. 
Although clients can download the entire database, this takes too long for a large database. 
Thus PIR that protects only the user is desirable in this scenario. Currently, PIR using HE 
focuses on encrypting value of “i”, and it is desirable to be able to encrypt the query itself 
such that the cloud can compute it on encrypted data. Given the rate of developments in 
homomorphic cryptography this seems achievable. 
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Chapter 4 
FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION SCHEME WITH 
SYMMETRIC KEYS 
We describe a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with symmetric keys in this chapter. 
We also present a formal analysis with proofs for performance and security of this scheme. 
Later sections of the chapter describe a protocol that uses the scheme for private data 
processing application.  
4.1 Preliminaries 
All computations are performed within the ring NZ , where N is a composite number, product 
of 2m numbers. Let λ denote the security parameter in context of making the scheme CPA 
secure. In order to make the scheme withstand ηnumber of plaintext attacks we choose m 
and λ  such that ln  poly( )mη λ= , where poly( )λ  denotes a fixed polynomial in λ . 
We choose 2m odd numbers ip and iq  , 1 i m≤ ≤ , which are mutually prime and of size 
2λ bits. If λ  is sufficiently large we can easily choose ip and iq , that is we take m to be a 
polynomial in λ  to ensure enough primes of length 2λ bits. Let i i if p q= and 
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i
N f
=
= ∏ . 
Lemma 1: Given m and λ where (poly( ))m O λ= , it is possible to obtain 2m odd mutually 
prime numbers of length 2λ bits in polynomial time. 
Proof: By Prime Number Theorem, there are approximately 
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x
x
prime numbers p x≤ . 
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Thus, when we are finding 2m primes of length b bits, at any point there are at least 
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−
primes left of length b bits. Since total numbers of exact length b bits is 
1 12 2 2b b b− −− = , the probability that a random number chosen is prime is 
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If m is a polynomial in λ and 
4
2m
λ−
 then this probability is non-negligible. Primality of 
a number can be checked in polynomial time, and we are choosing 2m numbers that are 
mutually prime, the test can be done in time ( )O m  which is actually (poly( ))O λ . 
Further we lay the foundation of the security of the scheme which is derived as a reduction to 
the hardness of large integer factorization problem.  
Lemma 2: Factoring N in polynomial time is infeasible if Large Integer Factorization is 
infeasible. 
Proof: Suppose A is an adversary which can factorize a number n into its two prime factors p 
and q of approximate equal bit length in polynomial time with probability 'p . Each factor if  
of N is a number with at least two prime factors. Thus, the probability ''ip  that an adversary 
can factorize if  is lesser than 'p . Since, N has m such factors, the probability with which the 
adversary can factorize N is 
1
'' ( ')
m
m
i
i
p p
=
≤∏ . If 'p  is negligible, the probability of factoring 
N in polynomial time is also negligible. 
 
Matrices over NZ  
The proposed scheme uses invertible matrices as keys with elements from the ring NZ . 
Lemma 3 below demonstrates the condition which must be satisfied for a matrix to be 
invertible in NZ . All matrix operations involved in this scheme are performed modulo N at 
element level. Calculating inverse of a matrix involves preparing transpose of adjoints (which 
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too are calculated modulo N) and then scalar multiplying by multiplicative inverse in NZ of 
the determinant of the matrix.  
Lemma 3: A matrix 4( )NK M Z∈ is invertible if and only if 0K∆ ≠ and gcd( ,K N∆ )=1, where 
K∆ is determinant of K. 
Proof: The process of finding inverse of a matrix involves multiplicative inverse of the 
determinant of the matrix, which exists iff the determinant value and N do not have a factor 
in common. Also, 0K∆ ≠ eliminates the division by zero condition. 
Corollary: No two rows or columns of the matrix K should be linearly dependent for it to be 
invertible.  
This is to ensure that 0K∆ ≠ . 
Lemma 4: Let 
1
m
i i
i
N p q
=
= ∏ , where ip and iq are mutually prime odd numbers of length 
2λ bits, a random matrix 4( )NK M Z∈ is invertible with non-negligible probability. 
Proof: As seen in Lemma 3, we need to choose a matrix 4( )NK M Z∈ such that. Since the 
distribution of values of ∆
 
of all matrices in 4( )NM Z  is not known, we cannot have a formal 
proof for this Lemma. Hence we provide an analytical proof. We pick random 100 matrices 
from the field and check for its invertibility. The experiment is repeated five times for a 
particular value of N, and is performed for various values of N. Fig 4.1 shows the number of 
invertible matrices varying with value of N. Fig 4.1(a) shows that for small values of N the 
probability of a random matrix being invertible is not high, but as we increase N, this 
probability shoots up. The 2m factors of N here are all prime numbers. Fig 4.1(b) shows 
when all 2m factors are mutually prime numbers, the probability is as high as is Fig 4.1(a). 
Hence we can deduce that probability of finding an invertible matrix is non-negligible for 
large values of N. 
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Figure 4.1(a) Variation of Number of invertible matrices with value of N, all factors prime 
 
Figure 4.1(b) Variation of Number of invertible matrices with value of N, all factors mutually prime 
 
4.2 Design Concept 
The basic concept is to translate operations on integers in a ring NZ to operations in 
ring 4 ( )NM Z  . Thus, all operations are on square matrices of size 4, which are sufficiently 
small to be used practically. In the context of making a homomorphic scheme to be useful 
enough, we propose a scheme with following set of operations: 
• Cryptographic functions: Functions to generate the symmetric key, encrypting a 
plaintext, and decrypting a Ciphertext. 
• Evaluation operations: To perform any arbitrary operation on data homomorphically, 
we need to translate it into these basic evaluation operations and then evaluate. 
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• Application specific functions: These functions provide facilities, like key translate 
function, recryption etc, for the scheme’s adaptation to an application scenario. 
 
The main idea is to construct a matrix with eigenvalue equal to the plaintext x. This can be 
very simply achieved with matrices of size 2, in ring 2 ( )NM Z  where N=pq, p and q being two 
large prime numbers, as follows: 
1
0( ) mod
0
x
E x N
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 
=  
 
 
The major fallacy here is that x is eigenvalue of eigenvector 1,0
1
0
v
 
=  
 

. An adversary with a 
ciphertext has to simply solve a linear equation system 1 1,0 1,0( ). .E x v x v=
 
to obtain x. to 
mitigate this problem we can apply a similarity transform to
0
0
x
r
 
 
 
, governed by an 
invertible matrix k, called the key. The scheme is now 
1
2
0( , ) mod
0
x
E x k k k N
r
−
 
=  
 
 
Though an adversary now cannot establish a linear equation system for transformed 
eigenvectors, it can very well derive the characteristic equation 
2
2
det( ( , )) 0 mod
( ) 0 mod
zl E x k N
z x r z xr N
− ≡
⇒ − + + ≡
 
Though it is infeasible to solve this equation without factorizing N, which is hard. Yet, a 
chosen plaintext attack is possible by merely two chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs. 
To thwart the chosen plaintext attack, we need to associate x with two eigenvectors 1v

 and 2v

. 
All plaintexts should have same 1v so that homomorphic operations are possible. 
Different 2v
 for different plaintext is sufficient to withstand the chosen plaintext attack. We 
discuss this security aspect formally in a later section. Having two eigenvectors implies 
increase in the dimension of matrices. Now, we consider matrices of size 4, and also 
strengthen the scheme by increasing the number of factors of N.  
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4.3 The Cryptosystem 
4.3.1 Key generation 
The secret key of the proposed scheme is an invertible matrix in NZ , of size 4 hence does not 
involve any computation theoretically. Yet the process of choosing the key matrix requires 
more elaboration. We can easily use Lemma 3 and its corollary to check invertibility of a 
matrix. There can be three approaches: 
1. Sequentially search the entire space of all possible 4x4 matrices in NZ beginning at 
any random point and stop at the first invertible matrix, returning this as key. The 
random point of starting the search could be very crucial in deciding the time taken 
for search. 
2. Randomly pick a matrix, check if it is invertible then search is over. Or repeat until an 
invertible matrix is found. The complexity is that of calculating determinant of a 
matrix. 
3. Instead of just randomly picking a matrix and checking whether it is invertible or not, 
or going through an entire list, we have a middle path. We build the matrix by random 
elements and pause as soon as its non-invertibility is proved, restart all over. This has 
lesser computational cost than finding determinant of entire matrix since it uses the 
results of lemma 3 and its corollary. 
In effect the key matrix in our scheme is constructed using elements from a pseudo-random 
sequence of numbers, convert them to modulo N. Matrix is constructed row wise, discarding 
any element (not the entire matrix) which would make a row linearly dependent on a previous 
row. Also, a row or column of all zeros is avoided. During construction of last row we also 
check for columns to be linearly independent from each other. When an invertible matrix is 
found it is published as key. Even this approach matches time complexity of 2nd approach in 
worst cases. This approach is used to implement the 3rd step in KeyGen algorithm, as shown 
below: 
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4.3.2 Encryption/Randomization 
The plaintext Nx Z∈ is encrypted or randomized into a matrix 4 ( )NC M Z∈ . It is indeed a 
similarity transformation of a diagonal matrix 1 2 3( , , , )x x x x , where ,1 3ix i≤ ≤ are solutions to 
sets of linear congruences computed using Chinese Remainder Theorem. The congruences 
depend on plaintext x and a random values r, ,Nr Z r x∈ ≠ . First we construct a 3x3 matrix as  
x r r
r x r
r r x
 
 
 
  
 
Now we pick m rows at random from this matrix to construct a mx3 matrix and call it X. This 
ensures that each row of X has only one element equal to plaintext x. each column of X is 
used to form the simultaneous congruences. 
The algorithm is as follows: 
 
Enc4(x,Ktuple)  
1. Choose a random value ,Nr Z r x∈ ≠  
2. Construct a matrix ( 3)X m×  such that each row has only one element equal to x, and 
other two equal to r. 
3. Using Chinese Remainder Theorem set ,1 3jx j≤ ≤  to be solution to the simultaneous 
congruences mod ,1j ij ix X f i m≡ ≤ ≤   . 
4. Ciphertext   1 1 2 3* ( , , , )*C k diag x x x x k−=  
Keygen4(m, λ )  
1. Choose 2m odd numbers ip and iq  , 1 i m≤ ≤ , which are mutually prime and of size 
2λ bits. 
2. Let i i if p q= and 
1
m
i
i
N f
=
= ∏ .  
3. Pick an invertible matrix k of size 4, 4 ( )Nk M Z∈  
4. Compute its inverse as k-1 modulo NZ .  
5. Output 1, , ,if N k k − as Ktuple. 
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4.3.3 Decryption 
This is a single step process which involves applying inverse transformation on the 
Ciphertext matrix and then extracting the plaintext as first element of the diagonal matrix 
obtained.  
 
The correctness of the decryption algorithm is proven below. 
Lemma 5: Encryption scheme (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is correct. 
Proof: We know that k* k-1 = k-1* k =I and for any matrix A, A*I=I*A=A. 
It is easy to note that Dec(C, k) = 1 11( * * )k C k−  
= 
1 1
1 2 3 11( * * ( , , , )* * )k k diag x x x x k k− −   
= 1 2 3 11( ( , , , ))diag x x x x  
     = x 
This proves the lemma. 
Example 4.1 
We present here a toy example for illustration of the method by selecting lowest prime 
numbers. Let m=2, let p={3,5} and q={7,11}. This gives f1= 21, f2 = 55 and N= 1155. 
For these parameters,  suppose the Keygen function generates a key  
333 1009 1093 394
566 870 285 192
305 642 456 407
326 1103 363 837
k
 
 
 =
 
 
 
  
with inverse as  
1
33 929 342 393
963 100 1113 161
202 88 1042 976
906 1051 944 441
k −
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
To encrypt plaintext x=257, we construct diagonal matrix as follows: 
Dec(C, Ktuple2-4)  
Output the plaintext as 1 11( )x kCk −= . 
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Select random number r = 291. The matrix X is 
291 257 291
291 291 257
X  =  
 
 
This gives us the linear congruences as follows: 
1
1
291mod 21
291mod 55
x
x
≡
≡
, 
2
2
257 mod 21
291mod 55
x
x
≡
≡
, 
3
3
291mod 21
257 mod 55
x
x
≡
≡
 
The solution to congruences are 291, 236 and 312 respectively. Encryption proceeds as: 
1
464 206 422 308
585 467 885 945
* (257, 291, 236,312)*
957 752 1119 882
315 1136 270 201
C k diag k−
 
 
 = =
 
 
 
 
Decryption is done as 
1
11
11
257 0 0 0
0 291 0 0[ * * ] 257
0 0 236 0
0 0 0 312
x k C k −
 
 
 = = =
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Evaluation 
There is only one general evaluation function defined for computation f.  It is expected that f 
be translated into basic operations on integers. Actual implementation involves analogous 
operations on matrices. Namely, to perform addition/subtraction/multiplication/division of 
two numbers homomorphically, we add/subtract/multiply/divide their ciphertexts simply as 
two matrices.  
1 2Eval( , , ... )nY f C C C← performs computation f on operands C1, C2...Cn. 
Our evaluation function doesn’t require any evaluation key. Note that all operations on 
matrices are also performed within the ring 4( )NM Z . To illustrate homomorphic operation, we 
present following example. 
Example 4.2 
Consider addition of two integers. Let m=2, let p={3,5} and q={7,11}. This gives f1= 
21, f2 = 55 and N= 1155. For these parameters,  suppose the Keygen function generates the 
key:  
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366 826 315 660
224 398 457 165
1063 849 492 597
401 1083 114 496
k
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
with inverse as  
1
1083 213 1 1053
1093 792 84 342
307 784 877 471
300 375 874 613
k −
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
To add two numbers, viz 5 and 12, we encrypt them using key k, and obtain following 
ciphertexts.  
1
286 618 534 180
954 662 651 765
Enc(5,k)=
122 1131 428 450
825 285 1020 196
C
 
 
 =
 
 
  , 
2
877 813 768 1122
60 1149 1152 33
Enc(12,k)=
507 245 304 759
472 531 828 150
C
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
Now, we add the ciphertexts instead of adding plaintexts.  
1 2
8 276 147 147
1014 656 648 798
629 229 732 54
142 816 693 346
C C C
 
 
 + = =
 
 
 
 
The resultant C is treated as a ciphertext and decrypted as usual.  
1
1 2 11
11
17 0 0 0
0 408 0 0( .( ) ) 17
0 0 1079 0
0 0 0 238
y k C C k −
 
 
 = + = =
 
 
 
 
As can be easily observed that the decryption (17) is actually the result of addition of the two 
plaintexts (5 and 12). Thus illustrating that the scheme is additively homomorphic. 
Now, we multiply the ciphertexts C1 and C2.  
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1 2
265 150 180 897
180 1005 450 933
*
185 775 500 609
82 816 933 360
C C C
 
 
 = =
 
 
 
 
The resultant C is treated as a ciphertext and decrypted as usual.  
1
1 2 11
11
60 0 0 0
0 440 0 0( .( ) ) 60
0 0 673 0
0 0 0 957
y k C C k −
 
 
 = + = =
 
 
 
 
As can be easily observed that the decryption (60) is actually the result of multiplication of 
the two plaintexts (5 and 12). Thus illustrating that the scheme is multiplicatively 
homomorphic. 
Thus, our scheme is fully homomorphic. 
 
4.3.5 Selecting N 
We assume a security parameter λ in context of making the scheme IND-CPA secure, that is 
in order to withstand η
 
number of plaintext attacks we choose m and λ  such that 
ln  poly( )mη λ= , where poly( )λ  denotes a fixed polynomial in λ . N is computed as 
product of 2m numbers. Xiao et al in [3] propose all these 2m numbers to be distinct and 
prime. We modify or relax this requirement to have 2m mutually prime numbers. Moreover, 
[3] allows N to be even (that is prime number 2 is allowed), which is dropped in our scheme. 
Thus, N is product of 2m numbers which are odd, mutually prime.  
Furthermore, the fact that these 2m numbers could now be composite implies that total 
number of prime factors of N is more than 2m, thus making scheme more secure (now N 
needs to be factorized into 2m composite factors). As we will discuss in a later section that 
security of the scheme is derived from the hardness of the problem of factorizing a large 
integer. The original scheme [3] has a vulnerability that capturing few ciphertexts may 
disclose the approximate length of N in bits. In order to benefit from hardness of factorization 
we increase value of m, implying that we increase the number of factors of N. But m is bound 
by length of N, hence to increase the number of prime factors of N, we can make these 2m 
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factors composite. Thus, we will have benefit of increasing the number of prime factors of N 
without increasing m. 
 
4.4 Application-specific Primitives 
The proposed scheme has primitives which would be useful when using this scheme for 
delegation of computation. These primitives derive their functionality from properties of 
matrices but are homomorphic in nature. They can be combined with homomorphic 
encryption or other encryption techniques for certain practical applications.  
4.4.1 Lock-Unlock Operations 
In order to evaluate a function homomorphically we need all inputs to be encrypted using 
same key. Moreover, decryption should also be performed using same key for retrieving 
result. This leads to natural asking for a method to calculate homomorphically on ciphertexts 
encrypted by altogether different keys, or atleast related keys but not same key. In this section 
we introduce primitives which can be used to convert ciphertexts from one key to ciphertext 
of other key. Also, how to generate a set of related keys so that operations can be performed 
on ciphertexts encrypted by them can be used in computations in some order and final result 
is decrypted easily using yet another key.  
For any matrix A and an invertible matrix k, Lock operation is defined as 
 
Thus, Lock outputs a randomization of the input matrix under k. It is same as the last step of 
encryption algorithm. Analogously, Unlock inverts this similarity transformation as in 
decryption algorithm. 
 
The exact application is discussed in next chapter. The beauty of this scheme is its simplicity 
and adaptability to a multikey scenario. Also, the operations are not to be performed  
necessarily in the order of Lock and then Unlock. We can also have Unlock followed by 
Lock (ie Unlock(B,k) to obtain A and then Lock(A,k) to get B.) 
Unlock(B, Ktuple2-4)  
Output the matrix as 1* *A k C k−= . 
Lock(A, Ktuple2-4)  
Output the matrix as 1 * *B k C k−= . 
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4.4.2 Key Set Generation 
For certain multi-user scenarios we need symmetric keys of different levels, in other words 
we need individual and group keys separately. Yet we desire to have some interoperability 
among these. Function KeySetGen generates the key matrices which can be used for 
encryption and Lock-Unlock operations with the property that it produces a set of matching 
keys. 
A set ( , ', '', ''')k k k k is said to be a set of matching keys if '* ''* '''k k k k= holds, where k is 
generally referred to as a master key. This is a three level set. We may also use a two level set 
in certain applications, that is ( , ', '')k k k  where '* ''k k k=   
 
This notion of matching keys is also useful when we want to link computations in some 
order, and at every step of computation the input argument is encrypted using a different key. 
 
4.5 A Multiparty Protocol for Privacy Preserving Data Processing 
4.5.1 System Model 
We consider a system model similar to [24] where cooperation of several entities makes the 
arbitrary times of the homomorphic calculations more efficient. We drop the assumption of 
non-colluding entities; rather we present a scheme which is collusion-resistant. We assume 
the processing to be done on data as arithmetic operations within ring ZN.  
KeySetGens(l, m, λ )  
1. Choose 2m odd numbers ip and iq  , 1 i m≤ ≤ , which are mutually prime and of size 
2λ bits. 
2. Let i i if p q= and 
1
m
i
i
N f
=
= ∏ .  
3. Pick l invertible matrices (1) (2) ( )( , ,..., )lk k k of size s, ( ) ( )i s Nk M Z∈  
4. Compute ( )
1
l
i
i
k k
=
= ∏  
5.  Output (1) (2) ( ), , , ( , ,..., )lif N k k k k as Keyset. 
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Figure 4.2 Privacy Preserving Data Processing: System Model and Protocol 
 
The role and functions of entities (refer Fig 4.2) involved in data processing are as follows: 
1. Data owner- possesses raw data which is not disclosed to others. Data owner is 
responsible for encrypting and masking data and has both encrypt and lock 
functionality. 
2. Processing center- has two divisions. The delegator division tells which data is 
required for certain computation and how to mask it. It has keyset generation 
functionality. The mapping division maps results from computation center to be 
consumed by certain user. It has only Lock functionality and obtains key from 
Delegator division. 
3. Computation center- performs calculations which are requested by the data user. It 
has access to masked data but not keys. It receives ciphertexts and formula. Sends 
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final result to mapping division of processing center. It has only evaluation 
functionality. 
4. Data user – has intention of performing some computation on data currently owned by 
data owner. Data user receives only the final result and cannot know any intermediate 
result or raw data. It has functionality of decryption. 
Our goal is computing f(P) where f is a function compose of addition and multiplication, and 
P=(x1,x2,…xn) is input data. We need to compute the result while keeping P secret. Also, 
function f is divided into several additions and multiplications, and computation is executed 
step by step (Note that this is same as Eval function). 
Security of the scheme is intuitive as entity which can access encrypted data does not have 
decryption key, and entity with decryption key are prohibited from accessing encrypted data. 
In a public key cryptosystem this arrangement would be susceptible to a collusion attack if 
two entities possessing decryption key and encrypted data decide to collude. But as we will 
see here these keys are not same in this scheme and hence it is collusion-resistant. 
4.5.2 Multiparty Protocol 
The protocol (refer Fig 4.2) for evaluating a function f(x1,x2,…xn) is: 
1. Data owner has data encrypted by key k(1), as  (1)Enc( , )i iY x k←  
2. Delegator prepares a list of data which is required for computation and sends it to data 
owner. Actually it can send the required indices 1…n. [Note that the sent indices have 
been renumbered for comprehensibility as 1…n and need not be actually continuous.] 
3. Data owner masks the data as (2)Lock( , )i iZ Y k←  
4. Computation center performs f to produce result as 1 2Eval( , , ... )nZ f Z Z Z← and sends it 
to Mapping division. 
5. Mapping division converts Z as (3)' Lock( , )Y Z k←   
6. Data user retrieves result as Dec( ', )y Y k←  
Here, the keys k(1), k(2), k(3) and k are matching keys with k as master key, generated by 
KeySetGen. 
As can be observed no key is sent to the Computation Center. The keys of data user and 
mapping division if combined cannot reveal k(1), the actual encryption key. Thus, the protocol 
is resistant to collusion. 
 
41 
 
4.6 Performance 
4.6.1 Complexity of Algorithms 
We need to choose 2m primes in the encryption scheme. The encryption algorithm requires 
both two matrix multiplications and also an algorithm to solve the m linear congruences that 
define the values a, b, and c. It takes time ( )O mλ  to construct the solution to these linear 
congruences. Multiplication has time complexity ( log log log )O m m mλ λ λ . So the overall 
complexity for encryption is ( log log log )O m m mλ λ λ . The decryption algorithm involves 
only two matrix multiplications, thus having same time complexity. 
Considering the complexity of the multiplication and addition algorithms, observe the size of 
the integers in the ring NZ . The value N is the product of m numbers of length λbits, so it is 
approximately an mλ bit number. There exist efficient algorithms for multiplication of b bit 
integers with complexity ( log log log )O b b b . For b mλ=
 
this 
becomes ( log log log )O m m mλ λ λ  . Addition is linear and thus has complexity ( )O mλ . 
4.6.2 Computational Overhead 
Homomorphic evaluation of a function is efficient if it has a low computation overhead. The 
overhead is defined as the ratio of the time taken for a computation homomorphically over 
ciphertext to the time taken to compute on plaintext. If a computation consists only of 
addition, adding two integers homomorphically in our scheme implies adding two matrices. 
This gives a constant overhead of 16, since we have to add two matrices of size 4, containing 
16 numbers. If a computation consists only of multiplication, multiplying two integers 
homomorphically implies multiplying two matrices, which means 64 additions and 64 
multiplications. Since N is a b bit number, cost of multiplying two numbers is O(b2). Thus 
giving computation overhead O(b) or ( )O mλ  . 
Hence, we conclude that our scheme has a worst case computation overhead ( )O mλ  that is 
varying linearly with the security parameter. 
4.6.3 Plaintext Expansion 
An integer is encrypted into a matrix of 16 numbers, resulting into a constant expansion 
factor of 16. It does not vary with bit length of N, and is independent of other security 
parameters.  
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Table 4.1 shows comparison between our proposed scheme and other popular FHE schemes 
with respect to the performance characteristics. 
TABLE 4.1  
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED SCHEME WITH OTHER FHE SCEHMES 
 DGHV BGV Our Scheme 
Key Size 10( )O λ
 
Equal to plaintext ( )O mλ
 
Computation 
Overhead 
3.5( )λΩ
 
2( )O λ
 
( )O mλ
 
Plaintext Expansion (log )O λ
 
3( )O λ
 
(1)O
 
 actually 16 
 
4.7 Security 
We shall discuss security of our scheme in terms of key recovery, onewayness, semantic 
security and indistinguishability. Then we proceed towards proving that the scheme is CPA 
secure.  
4.7.1 Security against Key Recovery 
In plain words this means that the knowledge of the cipher text must not allow adversaries to 
retrieve the key. Since for our scheme ciphertext does not reveal anything about key except 
its length, security against key recovery amounts to security against brute force attack.  
Key for our scheme is a l l×  matrix in ring ZN, which leads to 
2lN  possibilities of a key 
matrix. The probability that a random generated matrix is a key is 
2
1 lN . Checking whether a 
random matrix is the key or not, involves two matrix multiplications which implies Ω(l2) 
operations per multiplication. Given N is b bits long, the complexity of brute force attack is 
22( .2 )bllΩ . Table 4.2 gives the equivalent security level for different parameter values. It can 
be easily observed that our scheme is secure against brute-force attack even with smallest 
parameters. 
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TABLE 4.2  
BRUTE-FORCE SECURITY OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
Length of N (in bits) Equivalent security 
10 2172 
16 2268 
18 2300 
 
4.7.2 One-way security 
This implies that given a ciphertext an adversary should not be able to retrieve the 
corresponding plaintext. Since ciphertext is a randomization of the plaintext, and not a direct 
linear(or polynomial) function of the plaintext, in order to retrieve plaintext from ciphertext 
an adversary has to invert the similarity transformation and then only can any other linear 
algebraic methods can be useful to retrieve plaintext. 
Let us assume that certain permutation of identity matrix KI can be used to invert the 
transformation by following operation:  C'= KIC KI-1,where C is given ciphertext. To obtain 
plaintext from C' the adversary must be able to factorize N, that is adversary can retrieve 
plaintext only by solving congruences using Chinese Remainder Theorem, but for that it 
needs factors of N. Thus, oneway security of our scheme can be reduced to hardness of 
factorization N. As per Lemma 2, this cannot be done with a nonnegligible probability. Thus, 
onewayness security reduces to hardness of Large Integer Factorization problem. 
Formally we prove this security using following lemmas. 
Lemma 6: For 1<i<N, there exists a unique element ki GL4(ZN) so that 
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
mod ,  mod ,  mod ,
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
i i i i i jk p k I q k I f j i
 
 
 = = = ≠
 
 
 
,  
where I is the identity matrix in GL4(ZN). Additionally,
 
1
i ik k
−
= . 
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Proof: The first claim follows directly from Chinese Remainder Theorem, as pi is a factor of 
N, and fj=pjqj is also a factor of N. Further, we see  
2
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
ik
 
 
 =
 
 
 
which implies 1i ik k
−
= . 
 
Lemma7: Given plaintext x, key k and random element r, there exists y and random element 
s such that E(x,k)= E(y, kik). 
Proof: Here we note that the diagonal matrix constructed during encryption of plaintext x is 
like ( , , , )X diag x a b c= and it satisfies the congruences ( , , , ) modi i i iX diag x a b c f=  
, so  
1 1
. . mod . ( , , , ). mod ( , , , ) modi i i i i i i i i i i i ik X k p k diag x a b c k p diag a x b c p− −= =  
Also, 1. . mod . . mod modi i i i ik X k q I X I q X q
−
= =
 
and similarly 
1
. . mod mod ,i i j jk X k f X f j i− = ≠ . 
Let the diagonal matrix constructed during encryption of plaintext y 
be ( , ', ', ')Y diag y a b c= . Then the set of congruences ( , , , ) modi i i iY diag a x b c p= ,
 
mod iY X q= , and mod jY X f=  has a unique solution by the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem. This solution also satisfies 1 1. . . .i i i iY k X k k Y k X
− −
= ⇒ = .  
This implies 1 1 1( , ) . . . . ( , )i i iE x k k X k k k Y k k E y k k− − −= = = , which proves the Lemma. 
By Lemma 7 we deduce that an adversary has no polynomial time method to differentiate 
between the ciphertexts of two given plaintexts x and y if key is not known. Hence, the 
onewayness property of our scheme is established. 
4.7.3 Indistinguishability 
Intuitively, a symmetric encryption scheme is said to exhibit Indistinguishability property if 
given a ciphertext of one of the two messages selected by challenger, it should be “hard” for 
the adversary to guess which of two messages corresponds to the ciphertext. The definition 
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involves a simple game where the adversary is tested for the ability to guess which message 
is encrypted in a given ciphertext. The IND security game is defined as: 
1. Attacker produces two messages m0 and m1.  
2. The challenger returns the challenge ciphertext c = Enc(mb,k), b is 0 or 1. 
3. Attacker outputs b’. 
Attacker or adversary is a winner if it returns b’=b with probability more than 0.5 in 
polynomial time. 
Since the plaintext space is uniform, that is all plaintext have equal bit length, 
Indistinguishability implies semantic security. Hence, the proposed scheme is semantically 
secure. 
4.7.4 Security against Known Plaintext and Chosen Plaintext Attack 
Plaintext attack security captures the notion of an adversary who has the ability to eavesdrop 
on arbitrary messages between a sender and receiver before attempting to decrypt a message. 
The difference between known-pliantext attack and chosen-plaintext attack is that latter is 
adaptive one. The notion of security against the Known plaintext attacks is called 
indistinguishability under Known ciphertext,IND-KPA, defined as: 
1. Challenger runs KeyGen 
2. (Query Phase I) Attacker is given access to Enc(.,k) oracle. 
3. (Challenge Phase) Attacker produces two messages m0 and m1. The challenger returns the 
challenge ciphertext c = Enc(mb,k), b is 0 or 1. 
4. (Query Phase II) Same as Query Phase I. 
5. Attacker outputs b’. 
Attacker or adversary is a winner if it returns b’=b with probability more than 0.5. This game 
can be repeated polynomial number of times. For the adaptive case, the IND-CPA game is 
the same, except that Attacker generates the next pair of message only after seeing the 
previous ciphertext. If an encryption scheme is deterministic (the Enc algorithm is 
deterministic) then there is a unique, consistent encryption for every message. A deterministic 
encryption scheme cannot be IND-KPA or IND-CPA secure since we can simply ask for the 
encryption of the two challenge messages during the oracle access step and compare the 
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oracle's response to the challenge ciphertext. Since the proposed scheme is not deterministic, 
we can claim it to be IND-CPA secure. Next we prove this. 
Lemma 8: Given a plaintext x, its encryption C with random number r and a key k, any 
oracle Enc(.,k) will return C with a probability 
1
*3mN . 
Proof: The fact to be noted is that the encryption depends on number r which is chosen at 
random (in step 1 of encryption) by encryption oracle. Since Nr Z∈ , the probability that 
same r is chosen is 
1
N ,under a uniform probability distribution for selecting random 
number. Even when same r is chosen, the probability that same m rows of X will be selected 
(in step 2 of Encryption) to construct linear congruences is 
1
3m . Thus, probability of 
producing same ciphertext for a given plaintext and a key is
1
*3mN  . Hence, the claim is 
proved. 
From Lemma 8 we can observe that even for the smallest possible values of N and m 
(respectively 1155 and 2), the probability is 0.0000962. Thus, the scheme is IND-KPA 
secure. 
The proposed scheme is CPA secure if the number of chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs is less 
than the number of factors used in linear congruences during encryption. In other words, 
for 'm m≤  the scheme is CPA secure for 'm  plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This is so because 
more than m pairs chosen adaptively can help adversary to factorize N, hence break the 
scheme. 
 
4.8 Properties 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the properties of a Homomorphic scheme decide the category of 
applications it can be used in. Hence, it is important to discuss the properties of our proposed 
scheme in the light of its deployment to practical use. They are: 
1. Circuit/function privacy – All intermediate and final results of any computation 
are element of 4( )NM Z . Hence, the vital information like number of parameters, 
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size of circuit, intermediate results or purpose of function cannot be deduced from 
the result itself. 
2. Multiple Users – Our scheme can be deployed for multiple user computations. We 
have shown in Section 4.4 a possible method to do so. 
3. Parallel computation – The cryptographic primitives as such do not have a scope 
of parallelization. But, complexity of all algorithms are dependent on the matrix 
operations performed therein. These can be optimized by parallelizing the 
algorithms for addition and multiplication. 
4. Unlinkability – The output of encryption algorithm is a 4x4 matrix, 
indistinguishable from the output of the evaluation algorithm, hence is the 
unlinkability property of our scheme.  
5. Multi-hop – The output of algorithm Eval is a 4x4 matrix which can again be 
input to Eval algorithm without any intermediate (extra) operation, thus making 
possible multiple “hops” of evaluation to be performed in succession. 
 
4.8 Implementation Results 
We implement our algorithm using Java and evaluate its execution time. The computations 
were performed on a 3.40 GHz Intel Core i3-2130 processor. Table 4.3 lists the execution 
time for key generation, encryption and decryption for various lengths of N.  
TABLE 4.3  
EXECUTION TIME OF KEY GENERATION, ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION FOR VARIOUS 
LENGTHS OF N 
|N| (in bits) Key Generation Encryption Decryption 
12 33 ms 31 ms 17 ms 
18 356 ms 193 ms 124 ms 
24 16.43 s 42.91 s 6.45 s 
 
The data for homomorphic evaluations was gathered from running 10000 additions and 100 
multiplications of randomly selected numbers of varying length. Table 4.4 lists the execution 
time required for homomorphic addition and multiplication. 
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TABLE 4.4  
EVALUATION TIME OF ADDITION AND MULTIPLICATION FOR  DIFFERENT LENGTHS OF N 
|N| (in bits) Time for Addition (10000) Time for Multiplication (100) 
12 45 ns 8.98 ms 
14 46 ns 187 ms 
16 49 ns 337 ms 
18 78 ns 1.9 s 
20 113 ns 5.4 s 
 
For the purpose of comparison, we pick the results published in [20], a very practical 
implementation of BGV scheme. In [20], time taken to compute mean of 100 numbers of size 
128-bits is 20 milliseconds, and for variance is 6 seconds. They leave division in both the 
cases on the data user, and to allow mean computation it requires a 30-bit prime number as 
secret, while for variance it is 58-bit long. In our implementation, computation of mean takes 
1.38 milliseconds and of variance takes 6.83 seconds, including division operation. 
 
4.9 Variants 
We present here two variants of the scheme.  
1. First variant involves larger key size, that is matrices of size 8. This increases 
computational complexity of the algorithms, but the advantage gained is not much. It 
obviously increases the ciphertext space thereby contributing to security. In this case 
encryption algorithm will involve two random numbers. We present here only the 
encryption algorithm; other algorithms are analogous and can be understood 
accordingly. 
49 
 
 
Here, our aim is to give an idea how the proposed scheme can be generalized to have larger 
key size, hence better security. 
2. Instead of taking a large composite number N as base of ring NZ , it can be chosen as a 
composite power of 2. Algorithms for all primitives remain exactly the same, except 
the numbers pi and qi. They are now selected as powers of 2. All pi and qi are unique. 
For example, for m=2 we can choose p={2, 32} and q={128,8}. Here, the security 
parameter λ can be viewed as the maximum number of bits in a plaintext. This can 
further be combined with packing bits of plaintext into blocks of λ bits each. But it 
would require an evaluation function which can map binary operations on bits to 
operations on matrices (or integers).  
 
Enc8(x,k)  
1. Choose random values  r1 and r2, 1 2 1 2, , ,Nr r Z r r x∈ ≠ 2. Construct a matrix ( 7)X m× such that 
each row has only one element equal to x, three elements equal to r1 and other three equal to r2. 
3. Using Chinese Remainder Theorem, set ,1 7ix i≤ ≤  to be solution to the simultaneous 
congruences mod ,1j ij ix X f i m= ≤ ≤   . 
4. Ciphertext,  1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7* ( , , , , , , , )*C k diag x x x x x x x x k−=  
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Scope and promises of homomorphic cryptography in cloud computing environments cannot 
be ignored. Researchers all over the world are taking great interest in recent years to develop 
homomorphisms that can be deployed practically. Much of the focus is on imparting 
homomorphic capabilities to public key cryptosystems, while some applications can as well 
be handled with a symmetric key scheme. Hence, our efforts have been to propose ideas as to 
how symmetric keys and simple matrix-based operations could also lead to feasible schemes 
for cloud computing, specifically for delegation of computation and private data processing 
in clouds. communication costs involved in cloud computing are often large,  to make up for 
this we emphasize on having low time complexity for cryptographic primitives. 
We have proposed a scheme with a very efficient decryption method hence making it 
affordable for computationally weak devices, like a mobile device taking results from a 
computation centre of the cloud and decrypting it. We have proposed application-specific 
primitives making it easy to deploy to data processing applications. The evaluation functions 
are efficient and simple making it easy to carry out any arbitrary computation on data. We 
also suggest how to use symmetric encryption with multiple users, which is clearly key 
efficient as compared to the popular asymmetric approaches for multiple user applications. 
The scheme can be further optimized in matrix multiplication aspect. Decryption need not 
carry out complete multiplication of three matrices, rather the aim is to derive only the first 
element of the product matrix. 
The scheme can be modified to operate on polynomials instead of working with matrices, 
deriving idea from [21]. 
Application to Private information retrieval, searching index of an encrypted database and e-
voting can be useful enough. Designing protocols for the same could be a further 
contribution.  
The proposed scheme does not have any scope for targeted malleability or verifiability yet. 
Improvement in the scheme or introduction of some new primitives for verifiable 
computation can be appreciable effort.
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